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A Definitional Problem with the Pennsylvania
Public Employe Relations Act: "The Employer"t
BACKGROUND OF AcT 195
For many years, beginning with the New Deal, private labor-manage-
ment disputes have been subject to collective bargaining.' The public
sector, and public employes, however, did not share such a luxury Pub-
lic employes were specifically excluded from federal collective bargain-
ing protections.2 The rationale underlying the exclusion of public em-
ployes from collective bargaining protections was premised on the belief
that recognition of, and consultation with, public employe bargaining
units would be inconsistent with the concept of sovereignty of the state,
and the state as a non-profit employer.3
With the election of President Kennedy, who was heavily supported
by labor, the formal position of sovereignty of the state as paramount
over any rights public employes might wish to assert as to that sovereign,
began to be abandoned. The first step taken in giving the federal em-
ployes some semblance of the rights, which private employes had at-
tained under the Wagner Act of 1935 was taken in the Kennedy ad-
ministration, when an executive order4 which allowed a small amount
of representative power to be given to public employe unions, was put
into effect. The trend of broadening these rights has continued through
the administration of President Nixon with the issuance of another ex-
ecutive order broadening the effects of the original one.
Public employes on the state and local level, seeing collective bar-
t Special thanks is given by the author of this comment to Henry Ewalt, Esq., B.A.,
Allegheny College 1962; M.A., University of Michigan 1963; J.D., University of Michigan
1966; Member of the law firm of Reding, Blackstone, Rea & Sell of Pittsburgh, Pa.; Assis-
tant Allegheny County Solicitor 1971; Member of the National Labor Relations Board
1966-71.
I. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act states:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining ....
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1973).
2. Id. § 152(2) states:
The term "employer" includes any person acting as an agent for an employer, directly
or indirectly, but shall not include the United States or any wholly owned Govern.
ment corporation . . . or any State or political subdivision thereof ....
By excluding the public employer from federal protections, the public employe was
effectively denied protection.
3. Bernstein, Alternatives to the Strike in Public Labor Relations, 85 HARV. L. REV.
459, 460 (1971).
4. Id. See Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. [1959-63 Comp.] 521 (1964).
5. See Exec. Order No. 11,491, 3 C.F.R. 510 (1971).
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gaining breakthroughs on the federal level, began to clamor for collec-
tive bargaining rights. Until this point in time the only function served
by local public employe groups6 was that of a sounding board as to the
feelings of employes. This status of local employe groups varied widely
throughout the country in direct proportion to the political strength of
the membership and local attitudes toward administration of these
groups. Groups were consulted on a limited basis with respect to griev-
ances, but mere consultation without the power to force the employer
to be receptive to their views was meaningless. The local public em-
ployes viewed the federal scene, saw the collapse of the sovereignty of
the federal government argument, analogized their plight to the federal
employes, and saw very little difference in their situation. It is not sur-
prising that state and local governments followed the federal lead in
providing collective bargaining protections to their employes.7 It should
be noted that pre-dating action on the federal scene, some state legisla-
tures had recognized the public employe problem and made provisions
for it. An example of this is the State of Michigan's passage of public
employe legislation in 1947.8 This statute gave public employes a forum
from which they might collectively bargain as to grievances.9 Although
this statute was far ahead of its time, it lacked the crucial element of
the right to strike10 to reinforce the collective bargaining protections
given; yet, it was clear that at least one state legislature had seen and
attempted to deal with the problem.
Pennsylvania's protections for public employes did not come until
1970. The protections came in the form of the Pennsylvania Public Em-
ploye Relations Act.1
ACT 19512
With the passage of Act 195, Pennsylvania public employes1' were
given for the first time, the right to collective bargaining concerning
6. Reference is made to "employe groups" rather than unions, or units. Under the
National Labor Relations Act these groups were not recognized as legitimate representa-
tives of public employes.
7. See Tate, Public Employees' Right to Strike, 39 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 527 (1968). This ar-
ticle is based on an address by Mayor James H. J. Tate, then mayor of Philadelphia. The
address was delivered to the Federal Bar Association's Conference on Public Unionism,
March 28, 1968.
8. Micci. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.455(l)-(16) (1968).
9. Id. §§ 17.455(10)-(11).
10. Id. § 17.455(2).
II. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ ll01.101-.1602 (Supp. 1973). The Public Employe Relations
Act is also referred to as Act 195 because it was Pennsylvania Pamphlet Law 195 of 1970.
In this comment it will be referred to as either Act 195 or the Act.
12. Id.
13. When reference is made to public employes in this comment, it is exclusive of
305
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 12: 304, 1973
disputes14 and were given a limited right to strike.15 The Act says that
public employers 6 must enter into collective bargaining with public
employes. 7 The two definitional sections of "employer" and "employe"
seem to deliniate fairly accurately who may be considered as an em-
ployer or employe under Act 195, but as will be shown in this comment,
the legislature has left such a gap in definition as to make these provi-
sions meaningless, and therefore useless.
Although Act 195 is relatively new and many sections of it have not
as yet been construed by the courts,18 the Act has undergone some judi-
cial scrutiny and scholastic comment. A brief examination of the sec-
tions which have received some interpretation may be helpful in pro-
viding a general skeleton of the Act.
Act 195 sets up the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board as a sort of
"mini" National Labor Relations Board. The Pennsylvania Board's
main tasks now relate to public employe disputes because most of the
private disputes fall within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Re-
lations Board. This is the result of the policy of federal preemption in
police and firemen. Act 195 specifically excludes police and firemen who are covered under
a separate act. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.301(2) (Supp. 1973). Police and fire em-
ployes are provided for in the Collective Bargaining by Policemen or Firemen Act, PA.
STAT. ANN tit. 43, § 217.1 (Supp. 1973) [hereinafter referred to as Act 111]. This Act gives
the right of collective bargaining to police and fire employes, but substitutes binding arbi-
tration for the right to strike. Id. § 217.7.
14. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.101 (Supp. 1972). Section 1101.101 confers the general
right of collective bargaining by requiring public employers to bargain with their em-
ployes. Section 1101.710 says that such collective bargaining will encompass wages, hours
and other terms and conditions of employment. This section also says collective bargain-
ing will take place as to the collective bargaining agreement and any questions which
may arise under it. Section 1101.702 sets out matters not subject to collective bargaining
but this section has limited importance within the context of this comment.
15. Id. §§ 1101.1001-.1010.
16. Id. § 1101.301(1). Public employer is defined by this section as follows:
"Public employer" means the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, its political subdivisions
including school districts and any officer, board, commission, agency, authority, or
other instrumentality thereof and any nonprofit organization or institution and any
charitable, religious, scientific, literary, recreational, health, educational or welfare
institution receiving grants or appropriations from local, State or Federal govern-
ments .
Id.
17. Id. § 1101.301(2) defines public employe as follows:
"Public employe" or "employe" means any individual employed by a public employer
but shall not include elected officials, appointees of the Governor with advice and
consent of the Senate as required by law, management level employes, confidential
employes, clergymen or other persons in a religious profession, employes or personnel
at church offices or facilities when utilized primarily for religious purposes and those
employes covered under ...[Act Ill] ....
Id. (emphasis added).
18. It should be noted that the reason that the Act has not been the subject of a
great deal of judicial scrutiny is that most cases are settled prior to the entire appellate
procedure being exhausted. The relevant appellate review and procedural sections of the
Act can be found at PA. SrAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.1501-.1505 (Supp. 1973).
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matters which fall within the NLRB's jurisdiction. However, some
cases have interpreted the powers and duties of the Pennsylvania Board
as set out in Act 195.19 There has been judicial2 as well as law review
commentary2' on the appropriateness of the bargaining unit provision
of the Act. The Act has also produced litigation as to the various strike
provisions enumerated. 22 Certain disputes have arisen and determina-
tions have been made that given issues were not proper subjects for
bargaining.23
Act 195 is closely modeled after the National Labor Relations Act
and other national labor legislation currently in force.24 Pennsylvania
decisions25 interpreting provisions modeled after the national legisla-
tion conform closely to federal decisions in the area. One problem
which has arisen is in the Pennsylvania legislature's attempted defini-
tion of the term employer. It has attempted to adopt the definition of
employer under the National Labor Relations Act,26 however when ap-
plied to the peculiarities of the Pennsylvania political system, the defi-
nition under Act 195 loses its intended useful effect. A hypothetical
problem may be illustrative of the problem of applying the current Act
195 definition of employer to the reality of one phase of the Pennsyl-
vania political system.
THE HYPOTHETICAL PROBLEM
Assuming arguendo, the following situation were to arise, the current
body of law, and the Act itself, would be insufficient to give a conclu-
19. See Get Set Organization v. Philadelphia Fed'n of Teachers, 446 Pa. 174, 286 A.2d
633 (1971).
20. Id. See Service Employees Int'l Union v. Lackawanna County Comm'rs, 73 Lack.
J. 1 (Pa. C.P. 1972).
21. See Comment, Determination of the Bargaining Unit Under the New Pennsylvania
Public Employe Relations Act, 75 DIc. L. Rav. 490 (1970).
22. See, e.g., School Dist. v. Scranton Fed'n of Teachers, 445 Pa. 155, 282 A.2d 235
(1971); Armstrong Educ. Ass'n v. Armstrong School Dist., 5 Pa. Cmwlth. 378, 291 A.2d 120
(1970); South Allegheny School Dist. v. South Allegheny Educ. Ass'n, 55 Pa. D. & C.2d
94 (C.P. Alleg. Co. 1971).
23. AFL-CIO v. Shapp, 443 Pa. 527, 280 A.2d 375 (1971).
24. The National Labor Relation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1973) (popularly known as
the Wagner Act), was approved on July 5, 1935. Twelve years later this statute was
amended and supplemented by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (popularly
known as the Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1973), passed on June 23, 1947, over
presidential veto. Other relevant national labor legislation came into law in 1959 with
the passage of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 401
(1973).
25. See cases cited in notes 19-23 supra.
26. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1973), for the definition under the National Labor Relations
Act of the term "employer."
307
Duquesne Law Review
sive answer to the problem posed. The hypothetical is quite simply:
What would be the result if common pleas court employes27 sought to
organize and be represented by a bargaining unit? With whom would
the duly elected bargaining unit bargain? Would the county commis-
sioners, as the executives who "pay" these employes be the employer, or
would the local judiciary be considered the employer for purposes of
Act 195?28 Given the definition the Pennsylvania legislature has chosen
to enact, it is the contention of the author of this comment that no defi-
nitive answer, i.e., one logically and legally sound, can be reached given
the present state of the statute.
As yet, the courts of Pennsylvania have not resolved this problem,
but an examination of problems inherent in such a determination will
prove useful.
A PREFATORY NOTE:
WHO WILL HEAR THE ISSUE?
One interesting point which should be noted before any analysis of
the merits of arguments of who is the public employer under the Act,
is a jurisdictional point. Litigation such as that posed by the hypotheti-
cal will entail the president judge of common pleas court bringing an
action against the county commissioners involved, but it could arise in
the opposite manner with the commissioners as the initiating party.
There exists an inherent problem in such litigation each time a judge
is both a party and intepreter of the law. It can be argued that under
the new judicial article of the Pennsylvania constitution, 9 that it is
within the power of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to appoint a
judge of common pleas from another judicial district ° to hear the ac-
27. The "employes" referred to in the hypothetical problem are employes in the offices
of the prothonotary, clerk of courts, register of wills, register of deeds as enumerated in
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 4301 (1956). Employes as used in this article will also include
stenographers and tipstaves as enumerated in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 4422 (1956).
28. Examples will be given in the sections on the judiciary and county commissioners
as to appointment and payment infra.
29. PA. CONsr. art. V.
30. Id. § 10(a) provides:
The Supreme Court shall exercise general supervisory and administrative authority
over all the courts and justices of the peace, including authority to temporarily
assign judges and justices of the peace from one court or district to another as it
deems appropriate.
Id. § 10(c) provides:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules governing practice,
procedure and the conduct of all courts, justices of the peace and all officers serving
process or enforcing orders, judgments or decrees of any court or justice of the peace,
including the power to provide for assignment and reassignment of classes of actions
308
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tion, and by doing so relieve any prejudice which might have existed if
the judges of the county involved also sat as interpreters of the law.
However, this argument is somewhat undermined by the very fact that
the judicial articles function seems to have been to create a "unified
judiciary," i.e., a system in which local courts are not local function-
aries with independent interests from other courts throughout the
Commonwealth.8' Rather local courts were conceived to be totally in-
terrelated to the central judiciary, with the supreme court as overseer.
Given the fact that all local courts can be said to have the same in-
terests under a unified judicial system, the interest of a local judge in
being designated as employer under Act 195 is necessarily equal to that
interest of another judge who might be appointed from another judicial
district. Therefore, the visiting judge would still not be divorced from
his colleague, and prejudice to the opposing party would still ensue.
This problem is further magnified in that there would be no way for
this cause of action to be heard in a federal court.32
It should be noted that cases have been heard in state court where the
or classes of appeals among the several courts as the needs of justice shall require,
and for admission to the bar and to practice law, and the administration of all
courts and supervision of all officers of the judicial branch, if such rules are consistent
with this Constitution and neither abridge, enlarge nor modify the substantive rights
of any litigant, nor affect the right of the General Assembly to determine the juris-
diction of any court or justice of the peace, nor suspend nor alter any statute of
limitation or repose. All laws shall be suspended to the extent that they are incon-
sistent with rules prescribed under these provisions.
31. Id. § 1 states:
The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a unified judicial system
consisting of the Supreme Court, the Superior Court, the Commonwealth Court, courts
of common pleas, community courts, municipal and traffic courts in the City of Phila-
delphia, such other courts as may be provided by law and justices of the peace.
All courts and justicies of the peace and their jurisdiction shall be in this unified
judicial system.
Id. (emphasis added). See PA. R. JUD. ADMmN. 503 (explanatory note). This explanatory note
attempts to justify the supreme court's overall power as to staffing of the "entire" Penn-
sylvania judicial system but is also relevant to show that article V of the Pennsylvania
constitution did indeed attempt to create a "unified judiciary" in the Commonwealth.
The note provides:
This rule is intended to establish the principle that district court administrators are
not local county functionaries, but they are an indispensible arm of the new
central court administration apparatus mandated by the Judiciary Article with a
view to the coordinated management of all courts as part of a single system. Although
this result is obvious from even a superficial analysis of the Judiciary Article [partic-
ularly the reference to "staff" in section 10(c)] and its history, resistance by county
officers requires that this clarification take the form of a Supreme Court rule rather
than by legislation.
Id. (emphasis added). For a good explanation of rule 503, and the necessity for its
formulation in Pennsylvania see Meyer, Court Administration in Pennsylvania, 11 DuQ.
L. REv. 463, 474-75 (1973). See also In re Smith's Estate, 442 Pa. 249, 275 A.2d 323 (1971),
for the general proposition that Pennsylvania does indeed have a unified judicial system.
32. There is no basis for diversity jurisdiction nor is there a substantial federal ques-
tion. Therefore, federal courts would have no inherent jurisdiction to hear such an action.
This would appear to be a purely state court issue.
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judiciary was a party, 8 but this does not justify the ensuing prejudice to
the opposing party which is manifest in a system where a unified judi-
ciary exists. The choice facing the Pennsylvania judiciary is not an easy
one. If a forum is to be provided at all it must be the state court, yet
the hearing of such an action could indeed be violative of the commis-
sioners right to due process in that it seems fundamentally unfair to
have an adversary sit as judge under a unified judicial system. Only liti-
gation of this issue will produce an answer to this problem and the fate
of the definitional problem of the employer under Act 195 may hinge
on its outcome. If and only if this problem can be surmounted, the
judiciary and commissioners will present the following arguments as to
why they should be the employer for Act 195 purposes.
THE JUDICIARY'S POSITION:
THE ONE WHO "APPOINTS" THE EMPLOYE
IS THE EMPLOYER
The position of the judiciary in seeking to be considered as the "em-
ployer" of persons rendering services to them is grounded on statutory,
constitutional, and caselaw arguments.
The first argument is that the statutory law concerned "clearly" shows
that the judiciary is the employer under Act 195. The statutory law
states that the judiciary has the power to appoint stenographers 4 to aid
in producing official transcripts, and to appoint tipstaves35 or constables
33. See Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193 (1971) (action
in mandamus where president judge of Philadelphia Common Pleas Court sought to
compel the mayor and City Council to provide the necessary funding to maintain judicial
expenditures); for an explanation of Carroll, see 10 DuQ. L. REv. 491 (1972).
34. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 1801, 1802 (1962). Section 1801 provides:
The law judges of each of the several courts of common pleas, and the judges of the
several orphans' courts, in this commonwealth, shall select and appoint a stenog-
rapher, or stenographers, to report all suits and proceedings in their respective courts,
as hereinafter provided. Such appointees shall be known as official stenographers of
the respective courts, and shall hold their positions during the pleasure of the court.
Any official stenographer appointed under this act may, with the consent of the court,
temporarily supply a competent assistant or substitute stenographer. Such stenographer
and assistant stenographer shall be competent in the art of stenography, and, before
entering upon the duties herein provided, shall make oath or affirmation, before the
prothonotary or clerk of the particular court, to perform such duties with fidelity;
and a copy of such oath or affirmation, signed by the affiant, shall be certified by the
prothonotary or clerk administering the same, and filed of record in the proper office.
Id. § 1801 (emphasis added).
35. Id. § 1861, which provides:
The judges of the several courts of this Commonwealth shall have power to appoint
one or more criers for the respective court or courts, and so many tipstaves or con-
stables as may be necessary to attend upon the courts. The said officers shall be paid
310
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to tend to court. The judiciary may also appoint court interpreters" if
needed, and probation officers and assistants3 7 necessary to aid the Do-
mestic Relations Division. In fact, an overall reading of the statutory
material involved shows the judiciary does indeed have the power to
appoint the employes with which the hypothetical problem deals. This
position is further substantiated by the Pennsylvania Rules of Judicial
Administration, rule 50338 which states the the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania may appoint and remove such court employes as it deems nec-
essary and proper to maintain the judicial system.
Therefore, any assertion by the judiciary that appointment is indeed
their function is true, but the question remains whether appointment
and removal of employes is tanamount to being their employer under
the Act.
The judiciary's assertion that it is to be considered the employer
under Act 195 is also premised on the argument that the Pennsylva-
nia constitution article V, entitled "The Judiciary," is all encompas-
sing as to judicial power and instrumentalities touching the judiciary.
The judiciary must be independent, free from coercion by the other
by the respective county such sum for each day's attendance as the said judges shall
allow,-except in districts where the compensation has been heretofore fixed or lim-
ited by law, in which case such compensation shall remain as heretofore authorized.
Id. (emphasis added).
36. Id. § 1875, which provides:
The court of common pleas of each county is authorized to employ such number of
interpreters and in such languages as the court may deem necessary for the proper
transaction of its business. Such interpreters may be removed by the court at any
time. Any interpreter so appointed shall, when required, act as interpreter in any
court of the county, and shall receive out of the county treasury such annual or
per diem compensation as the appointing court shall fix ....
Id. (emphasis added).
37. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 2043.34(b), which provides:
A probation officer, together with such assistants as may be necessary, appointed by
the court, shall be in charge of the Domestic Relations Division, for the purpose of
processing the complaints filed and making effective the orders of support entered.
Said probation officer shall keep an account of all orders made by the court and a
record of all payments made thereunder and shall bring promptly to the attention
of the court and the district attorney any default in compliance with the court's
order. The probation officer shall make an annual report to the court of the full
activity of the Domestic Relations Division.
Id. (emphasis added).
38. PA. R. Jun. ADMIN. 503, which provides:
(a) The Supreme Court may appoint and remove such Deputy Court Administrators
of Pennsylvania and such district court administrators and other personnel of the
system as may be necessary and proper for the prompt and proper disposition of
the business of all courts and justices of the peace.
(b) Subject to any inconsistent orders of the Supreme Court or the Judicial Council,
the Court Administrator may appoint and remove such Deputy Court Administrators
of Pennsylvania, district court administrators, and their staff, as are authorized for
the system.
Id. (emphasis added).
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branches. The argument continues that any designation of the execu-
tive or legislative branches as employer of basically judicial employes
would violate the time honored principle of separation of powers con-
tained in the Pennsylvania constitution and subject the judiciary to
possible coercion from the other two branches.
This separation of powers argument is a weighty one and deserves
scrutiny. There is, however, no reference in the Pennsylvania constitu-
tion which specifically refers to the separation of the branches.39 But
"judicial interpretation" of the constitution has held that in order to
maintain independence between the branches some idea of separation
of powers must be recognized. 40 Legal writers have also come to the
same conclusion.41 There have been many cases holding that this in-
herent separation of powers prevents one branch from usurping an-
other's function. 42
In summary, the judiciary's constitutional argument seems sound and
would be one factor weighing heavily in any determination as to
whether the courts are employers under Act 195. An independent judi-
ciary is a cornerstone of American government and if it can be shown
that not elevating the judiciary to the status of employer would indeed
allow the executive and legislative branches to coerce the judiciary, the
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, and courts themselves, would un-
doubtedly find the courts to be the employer of judicial employes.
A strong argument and perhaps a possible direction of Pennsylvania
courts on this issue, can be found in recent caselaw. The case most di-
rectly affecting the issue is Carroll v. Tate.43 As previously stated in the
prefatory note to this comment, this case concerned an action in man-
39. See Nutting, Delegation and Separation o1 Powers, 21 U. Pnrr. L. REv. 163 (1959).
See generally Wilson v. Philadelphia School Dist., 328 Pa. 225, 195 A.90 (1937).
40. Stander v. Kelley, 443 Pa. 406, 25 A.2d 474 (1971); Wilson v. Philadelphia School
Dist., 328 Pa. 225, 195 A.90 (1937); Bailey v. Waters, 308 Pa. 309, 162 A.819 (1932).
41. See Brownell, Separation of Powers: Executive and Legislative Branches, 60 DIcK.
L. REV. 1 (1955); White, Disturbing the Balance, 85 U. PA. L. REV. 678 (1937).
42. United States v. 15.3 Acres of Land, 154 F. Supp. 770 (M.D. Pa. 1957) (the ascertain-
ment of just compensation in an eminent domain proceeding is a judicial rather than
legislative function); Cannon v. United States, 45 F. Supp. 106 (E.D. Pa. 1941), aff'd, 128
F.2d 452 (3d Cir. 1942) (held that courts have nothing to do with purely legislative
matters of public finance); In re Moore, 447 Pa. 526, 291 A.2d 531 (1972) (statutory
requirement that hearings on objections to nominating petitions be held within ten (10)
days of the last allowable day for filing nominations was held to be an encroachment on
the judicial function); Leahey v. Farrell, 362 Pa. 52, 66 A.2d 577 (1949) (legislature has
no affair in the administration of the courts); Appeal of Ervine, 16 Pa. (4 Harris) 256
(1851) (legislature cannot encroach on the judicial function).
43. 442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193 (1971).
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damus to compel a city council to deliver funds necessary to carry on
the judicial function. The argument of the judiciary will likely be that
the ability to maintain an independent judiciary is just as much depen-
dent on receiving sufficient funds as it is being classified as employer of
employes rendering services to the courts. Whether the judiciary is
coerced directly through its purse or directly via its employes is of little
consequence. Coercion of any type would be intolerable.
In Carroll, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania viewed the financial
maintenance of the judiciary problem. An examination of this case,
therefore, may shed some light on how the court might rule as to the
employer status of courts. The majority in Carroll stated that the judi-
ciary must possess the inherent power to determine and compel pay-
ment of those sums of money which are reasonable and necessary to
carry out its mandated responsibilities if it is to be in reality a coequal
independent branch of the government. 44 The majority continued by
citing a brief passage from McCollock v. Maryland,45 which may have
reflected the court's overall philosophy as to the problem, when it said
the power to tax involves the power to destroy. A legislature has the
power of life and death over all courts and over the entire judicial sys-
tem.46 With this thought in mind, the majority in Carroll had little
difficulty in holding that the courts must possess sufficient facilities to
cause the legislature to acceed to reasonable financial demands. If the
courts lacked this power of self-perpetuation, they would be lost. In a
separate concurring opinion, Judge Pomeroy advanced another reason
for holding that the judiciary must have the inherent power to main-
tain itself by having access to reasonable financial resources. He stated
that with belief, faith, and reliance in the judiciary already at a low, if
the court were to be given insufficient funds such public trust would al-
most vanish.47
Given the tenor of the court in Carroll, it seems the defense of the
judiciary of coercion by finance, as in Carroll, or coercion by employ-
ment as in the hypothetical, may receive ready acceptance by the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania. The citing of Carroll by the judiciary
in its quest to be designated employer over the employes in question
will indeed carry a great deal of weight.
44. Id. at 52, 274 A-9d at 197.
45. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
46. 442 Pa. at 57, 274 A.2d at 199.
47. Id. at 62-63, 274 A.2d at 200 (Pomeroy, J., concurring).
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Tim COUNTY COMMISSIONERS' POSITION:
WVE PAY, WE EMPLOY
The position of the county commissioners 8 in such a dispute can
be phrased quite readily. The entity who pays the employes is the em-
ployer under Act 195. 49 This position seems quite tenable since one
normally feels that the person paying the employe is really an employer.
Therefore, the questions arise as to what is meant by payment, and do
the county commissioners truly pay these employes?
Under the county commissioners' system, the commissioner has a
dual role in serving in a legislative and executive capacity.50 Therefore,
when payment is made to employes, two possible meanings of payment
can be inferred. The first is that payment is made when the physical
task of paying occurs. The second is that payment occurs when the
monies necessary are appropriated.
If payment is taken to mean the department actually dispursing the
pay checks, then the county commissioners are incorrect in saying that
they pay the employes, because this function is handled by the county
controller. 51 If payment is taken to mean the party signing or authoriz-
ing signature of the payroll checks, again the county commissioners are
in error saying that they, in fact, make payment. This task is handled
by the county treasurer or his agent, the paymaster.52 Therefore, the
only tenable definition of payment left open to the commissioners is
48. When the term county commissioners, or cites to employe sections, are used in
this comment, citations are to the second class county code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 3101-
6302 (1956). Parallel citations to the county code and third class county code have been
omitted.
49. Interview with David Donahoe, Secretary to the County Commissioners of Allegheny
County, in Pittsburgh, Sept. 13, 1973 [hereinafter referred to as the Donahoe Interview].
50. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 501, 3501-09 (1956).
51. Id. § 4950. This reference to the county controller actually disbursing funds is
taken from the Donahoe Interview note 49 supra, and is the case in Allegheny County.
Most counties in Pennsylvania handle disbursements in this fashion. But ten years ago
this function was carried on by the commissioners and to a limited extent in some
counties may still be the practice. The change to the controller dispursing payments was
made because of the controller's access to computerized methods of dispursing payrolls,
and it was felt that the function would be more appropriately and efficiently done by
the controller. The switch was made by agreement rather than by statute.
52. Id. § 4953 provides:
The treasurer shall pay no money out of the county treasury except on warrants
drawn by a majority of the commissioners and countersigned by the controller. He
shall cancel all warrants, when paid, by distinctly spearing or cutting them, and shall
deliver such warrants to the controller who shall also cancel the same. He shall
report daily to the controller all monys paid out by him, giving the number of the
warrant and the party to whom paid. All outstanding warrants issued before the
controller enters upon the duties of his office shall be presented to him as other
claims against the county.
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that of appropriating5a the funds used for payment. The mechanics of
the appropriation process require that the commissioners draw a war-
rant on the treasurer54 but this formality in no way lessens the fact that
appropriation would be tantamount to payment.
Assuming arguendo, that appropriation is indeed the same as pay-
ment, a question still exists as to whether the existence of salary
boards,5 5 which determine salaries in given situations, weakens the
53. Appropriation of necessary county salaries is provided for in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16,
§ 4980 (1956), which provides:
The fiscal year of the county shall begin on the first day of January and end on the
thirty-first day of December of each year. On or before the first day of February of
each year and at least thirty days prior to the adoption of the annual budget, the
controller shall transmit to the commissioners a proposed budget giving a detailed
estimate of and for the legitimate purposes of the county for the current year, in-
cluding interest due and to fall due on all lawful debts of the county bearing interest.
Such budget, when finally adopted by the commissioners, shall be the guide to the
commissioners in fixing the tax rate. Said budget shall be prepared as provided
therein. The commissioners shall, at the same time the budget is adopted, fix such
rate of taxation upon the valuation of the property taxable for county purposes as
will raise sufficient sum to meet the said expenditures. The commissioners shall not,
by contract or otherwise, increase the expenditures of the county in any year to an
amount beyond the taxes assessed as aforesaid for said year.
Id. (emphasis added).
54. Id. § 4951 provides:
The commissioners shall draw no warrant on the treasury for any debt, claim or
demand whatsoever not audited and approved by the controller, as provided for in
the foregoing section, except for the fees of jurors, witnesses, criers and tipstaves
of the several courts of the county. The amount of said fees shall be ascertained by
said courts and entered on the records thereof and duly certified by their respective
clerks to the commissioners, being first sworn to before the controller. Said certificate
shall be delivered by the commissioners to the controller for preservation as soon as
the warrants are issued.
Id. § 4952 provides:
All warrants drawn on the county treasury by the commissioners shall be counter-
signed by the controller, who shall keep a correct register thereof, noting the number,
date and amount of each, the date of payment, and to whom and for what issued.
The controller shall report to the commissioners monthly, or oftener if required by
them, the amount of outstanding warrants registered and the amount of money in the
treasury.
55. The relevant sections which relate to the salary board are PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16,
§§ 4820, 22-24, 25(c) (1956). Section 4820 provides:
The salaries and compensation of county officers shall be as now or hereafter fixed
by law. The salaries and compensation of all appointed officers and employes who
are paid from the county treasury shall be fixed by the salary board ....
Section 4822 provides:
There is hereby created in the county a salary board, which shall consist of the
three individual members of the Board of county commissioners and the county
controller. The chairman of the board of county commissioners shall be chairman of
the salary board and the county controller secretary thereof. The Board shall meet
and organize on the first Monday of January of each year.
Section 4823 provides:
The Board, subject to limitations imposed by law, shall fix the compensation of all
appointed county officers, and the number and compensation of all deputies, assistants,
clerks and other persons whose compensation is paid out of the county treasury, and
of all court criers, tipstaves and other court employes, and of all officers, clerks,
stenographers and employes appointed by the judges of any court and who are paid
from the county treasury.
Section 4824 provides:
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argument of the county commissioners that appropriation is equal to
payment. The salary board is a creature of legislative initiative formed
in an attempt to rectify certain salary problems arising in departments
of the given county. The board is composed of the three county com-
missioners,56 the county controller, 7 and in the case of salary disputes
concerning appointees of the judiciary, the judge58 of the court served
by that appointee, is also a member of the board. The board is chaired
by the chairman of the county commissioners. 59 Meetings of the board
are initiated by the administrative head of the department from which
the salary dispute eminates.60 In the case of salary disputes of "judicial
employes," the president judge of the court would be the initiating
force.61
The board meets and does, indeed, deal with the budget. It also meets
to hear adjustments needed by the various departments because depart-
mental needs may have varied from the time of the original appropria-
tion. These adjustment meetings are confined, however, to the limits
of the budgeted amount for the year.0 2 Any adjustment made must be
below the budgeted amount for that department. It should be remem-
bered that the commissioners set the original budget.
Therefore, although the salary board may to some extent indirectly
"alter" appropriations throughout the year, it cannot be said that it
does so sufficiently to deny the claim of the commissioners that they
"pay" because they "appropriate."
THE PROBLEM IN Focus
The term employer has been defined as follows: "One who employs
the services of others; one for whom employes work and who pays their
At each annual meeting, the board shall revise the salary schedule so far as it shall
deem such action necessary. From time to time between annual meetings, whenever
required by any judge, county officer or executive head of any separate board, com-
mission or division the number or compensation of whose deputies, assistants, clerks
and employes is sought to be fixed, the board shall meet and consider and shall fix
and determine the same. All salaries fixed under the provisions of this act shall be
paid out of the county treasury.
Section 4825(c) provides:
Whenever the board shall consider the number or salaries of officers or employes
appointed by any judge of any court, such judge shall sit as a member of the board,
as long as any matter affecting any of this appointees is under consideration and no
longer.
56. Id. § 4822.
57. Id.
58. Id. § 4825(c).
59. Id. § 4822.
60. See Simon v. Allegheny Co., 337 Pa. 436, 11 A.2d 868 (1940).
61. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 4825(c) (1956).
62. Donahoe Interview, note 49 supra.
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wages and salaries." 3 Act 195 defines employer only in terms of which
political subdivisions, agencies, and authorities, etc., may be considered
as employers without any further definition as to criteria necessary to
be a public employer within the Act. 64 Thus the dilemma is made
clear. By merely enumerating a list of public entities who could be
employers within the meaning of the Act, and not further defining
functions, such as payment or appointment etc. as criteria, the legisla-
ture left sufficient room for both the judiciary and county commis-
sioners to present plausible, workable, definitions which are in no way
contradictory to the definitional provisions of Act 195.
Both groups seeking to be employers for collective bargaining pur-
poses fit within the Act's definition. Therefore, the trier of fact is faced
with the following alternatives.
The first alternative would be an inquiry leading into some balancing
of the need for an independent judiciary versus a power of the purse
argument. Whatever the result of such an inquiry, neither side would
be justified in calling itself the employer, given the other side's qualifi-
cations under the language of the Act. Such a result would be contra to
the fundamental idea of jus cogens"5 in the law. The court under this
approach would be relegated to the unhappy position of deciding
litigant's rights in much the same fashion as it might in the situation
of a true owner of property suing an innocent purchaser who purchased
from a thief. Both litigants before the court are "in the right." The
judicial task is never an easy one but when confronted with this type
of a determination becomes nothing more than a guessing game.
The next alternative which a court might choose is one which some
writers have advanced to apply to the situation where because of failure
in legislative definition the court is forced into its guessing game pos-
ture.66 These writers have said that when a given area of law is felt to
be best suited to legislative amendment rather than judicial deter-
mination, that some determination of the case should be given on the
merits, but in such a manner as to effectively remand the issue to the
legislature. The court, in making such a determination, throws the
issue back to the political and legislative forces within the government
63. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 618 (4th ed. 1951).
64. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.301(1) (Supp. 1973).
65. Jus cogens is a latin phrase which delineates a legal concept that there must
be some idea of "fairness" in the law.
66. See generally A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); Bickel & Wellington,
Legislative Purpose And The judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARv . REv.
1 (1957).
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who will then feel the necessity and pressure of redefinition of the
troublesome term. Thus the court in no way can be accused of judicial
legislation and the desired amendment in definition occurs in what
the judiciary feels is the proper forum. This "effective judicial remand"
to the legislature could be accomplished by "deciding on the merits"
that one party is the employer for Act 195 purposes, but included
within such an opinion would be the fact that this decision is made
within the present confines of the Act's definition and a statement that
the definition is somewhat unclear. The court might then legitimize its
decision by saying that it could have decided this problem in such a
way as to judicially legislate the result it wished but it refrained from
doing so. The court could then say that legislation, i.e., redefinition,
is a legislative function, and the judiciary has no place in such a func-
tion. The judicial function is interpretation not legislation.
Thus, the court would decide the controversy before it but make its
feeling known as to the legislative definition with which it must work.
REDEFINITION BY THE LEGISLATURE
There appear to be two viable alternatives for the legislature if the
legislature heeds the judiciary's call to redefine the term employer.
This first redefinitional answer should be clear by this point: add to
the definition terms such as pay, appoint or similarly specific terms
to further modify the definitional class of public employer scheme now
within the Act.
The other alternative is somewhat more indirect and will require
some background. A point not mentioned until now is that the judi-
ciary in Pennsylvania is paid from state funds67 while the employes, con-
cerned, as previously mentioned, are paid by county funds.68 It would
67. For statutory authority showing that judges are paid from state funds, see PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 830.26, .29-.30, .31(a) (Supp. 1973).
68. The payment out of the county treasury of the employes concerned was mentioned
in the section of this comment where arguments on behalf of the commissioners were
advanced. Illustrative of this point are sections on the salaries of tipstaves in counties
of the first and second classes. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1866 (1962), states:
From and after the passage of this act, each tipstave of any county of the first class
of this Commonwealth shall receive, out of the county treasury, such annual salary as
the appointing court shall fix: Provided, That the salary paid shall not exceed
three thousand dollars ($3,000) per annum.
Id. (emphasis added). PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1868.1 (1962), states:
Salaries of tipstaves in the courts of common pleas, oyer and terminer and general
jail delivery, quarter sessions of the peace, County Court of Allegheny County, and
orphans' courts in counties of the second class shall be fixed by the salary board of
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seem that the legislature could redefine salary provisions either to in-
clude the judiciary in the county scheme or include the employes
within the state salary picture. The choice of paying a state branch,
the judiciary, on a local level is not a good one. Separation of powers
would be a bar. The other choice of paying employes, now paid by
county funds, with state funds seems a much more plausible answer.
The alternative of paying "county" employes with state funds, how-
ever, faces practical considerations which might preclude it. These
practical considerations are that the Commonwealth tax base is already
spread thin, and the Commonwealth would not be anxious to add
employes to its payroll. Assuming that the Commonwealth would ac-
cept this alternative, certain legal points remain. Are there constitu-
tional or statutory problems in such a change?
There appear to be no real constitutional blockades to such a course
of action. In fact one provision in the local government article of the
Pennsylvania constitution would seem to foster within it sufficient
breadth to allow such a change. Section five 69 of that article calls for
intergovernmental cooperation and could supply the constitutional
basis for such a change. The relevant statutory sections also give weight
to the argument that the Commonwealth could legally accept such an
obligation. This is shown by a recent amendment as to the salaries of
county stenographers and clerks which shows that the Commonwealth
has indeed accepted the salary obligation. 70 There would seem to be
no rational distinction between the payment with state funds of stenog-
the county at an amount not less than three thousand, one hundred forty-four dollars
($3,144) per annum, and shall be uniform and of equal amounts.
Id. (emphasis added). PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, 1 1875 (1962), is the corresponding salary
section applying to court interpreters.
69. PA. CONST. art. IX, § 5 states:
A municipality by act of its governing body may, or upon being required by initiative
and referendum in the area affected shall, cooperate or agree in the exercise of any
function, power or responsibility with, or delegate or transfer any function, power
or responsibility to, one or more other governmental units including other municipal-
ities or districts, the Federal government, any other state or its governmental units,
or any newly created governmental unit.
70. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1835 (Supp. 1973), states:
To facilitate the labors of the judges of the court of common pleas and orphans'
court of the county in which the seat of government is or may be located in the
disposition of the business of the Commonwealth, the said judges are hereby au-
thorized to appoint and set the salaries of stenographers and clerks provided the cost
of such help shall not exceed the sum of seven thousand two hundred fifty-eight dol-
lars ($7,258) per annum for each of said judges, and a like sum of seven thousand two
hundred fifty-eight dollars ($7,258) for an administrative assistant to such courts. Such
salaries shall be paid by the Commonwealth.
Id. (emphasis added).
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raphers or the payment of interpreters with county funds. The legal
obstacle is far from insurmountable.
CONCLUSION
Legislative redefinition would best be served with a simple redefini-
tion of the term employer to include criteria such as payment or ap-
pointment. The Pennsylvania legislature will be slow to reorganize the
salary structure of employes within the Commonwealth. Political
opposition would most probably be to keen. Also, it seems incongruous
to disturb an entire salary structure just to get a desirable result as to
who should be an employer for collective bargaining purposes under
Act 195.
Therefore, an effective judicial remand with a redefinition to include
qualifying language of the term employer seems to be the optimal solu-
tion to the problem.
LARRY DAVID YOGEL
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